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The power of insensitive semantics

No way out of the schism

... the sentence 'Snow is white' means that snow is white, the sentence 'Ted is ready' expresses the proposition that Ted is ready, and the sentence 'there is nothing to eat' is true iff there is nothing to eat.¹

Philosophers and linguists have used the words 'semantics' and 'pragmatics' in an extraordinarily confusing array of ways over the last 100 years.²

Language is not a game/rule-following behaviour. It does not have any end in itself.

¹ E. Borg, *Pursuing Meaning*, Oxford University Press: Oxford UK 2012, IX.

² H. Cappelen, *Semantics and Pragmatics: Some Central Issues*, p. 20. In G. Preyer, G. Peter eds., *Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism. New Essays on Semantics and Pragmatics*, Oxford UP: Oxford University Press 2007.

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Introduction

1. *The new turn.* Insensitive Semantics, the so-called “new linguistic turn of minimal semantics”, is a rejection of the theory of meaning which has argued that lingual expressions are to be fixed by inferential roles, by holism in semantics as well as by the use of language.³ This is one of the main questions in the contemporary philosophy of language, because the central problem is whether the content of thoughts, perceptions and inscriptions is to be explained by the principle of compositionality without any limit. This is worth mentioning, because inferential semantics has argued on the contrary that semantics is not compositional. This also implicates the philosophy of mind, because the understanding of the utterance of sentences is to be explained by a module of mind. But it should also be mentioned, looking back at the Quine-Davidson tradition since the 1970s, that Insensitive Semantics is a rejection of radical translation and interpretation (Quine, Davidson), because the constraint of radical translation and radical interpretation, for example, by stimulus meaning, the principle of charity and correspondence—distal meaning of triangulation—, is not a guarantee of a successful so-called “intelligible redescription”.⁴

2. *Living in the schism.* In the meantime we live in a *schism* of the philosophy of language, semantics and in the philosophy of mind as well. In

³ E. Lepore, H. Cappelen, *Insensitive Semantics. A Defense of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism*. Malden MA: Blackwell 2005, J. A. Fodor, Lepore, *The Compositionality Papers*. Oxford: Oxford University 2002, E. Borg, *Minimal Semantics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004, *Pursuing Meaning*, G. Preyer, G. Peter eds., *Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism*. Preyer, Peter eds., *Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth*. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005.

⁴ On a rejection of Quine’s and Davidson’s basic theory in epistemology and semantics, Preyer, *Von der Radialen Übersetzung zur Radialen Interpretation – Quine, Davidson und darüber hinaus*, free to download: *Academia.edu* under Preyer, *mit* Davidson, Quine 2015.

particular, we should conclude there is nothing like pragmatics as a theoretical description of speech acts. From Insensitive Semantics is drawn the delimitation of semantics by speech act pluralism. Pragmatics itself does not have any theoretical foundation.⁵ Specifically, Wittgenstein's later philosophy goes wrong and there is in the philosophy of language of the last century a confused distinction between semantic and pragmatic speech act content which should be abandoned.

The overall question in contemporary philosophy and theory of language and semantics is: what does the context of speech occasion contribute to the meaning of an uttered sentence?⁶ Therefore the main question in the theory of language is "can words themselves refer to something, or can this be done only by the speaker?" and "are sentences, i.e. mere utterances, capable of making claims about the world, i.e. of expressing proposition?"⁷ Thereby the question arises: "What do the semantic properties of symbols supervene on?"

⁵ It should be mentioned that the domain of pragmatics has not been uniformly, for example, as semiosis (C. W. Morris), „the empirical investigation of historically given *natural languages*“ (R. Carnap), the reference of indexicals (R. Montague and others), or as illocutionary acts. J. L. Austin and J. R. Searle have not introduced their speech act theory as pragmatics. Austin, for example, has emphasized the „fallacy of use.“ He has not accepted the theory about meaning as similar with the use of language. J. J. Katz, *Propositional Structure and Illocutionary Force. A Study of the Contribution of Sentence Meaning to Speech Acts*. Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester Press 1977 has the correct view to the situation of semantics: "The mistake of the ordinary language tradition is twofold: first, to swallow the conception of formal theories as paradigmatically the statement-logics developed by Carnap and others, and second, to assume that an adequate approach to natural language requires us to account directly for use," p. 227.

There has also been a large debate about the status of speech act, for example, as solely performative or as declarative utterances. In the meantime it is not disputed that performatives also have a declarative role, because something is said. For a summary about the debate, Preyer, *Anhang Sprechaktsemantik: J. L. Austin, J. R. Searle, H. P. Grice, P. F. Strawson*, pp. 113-138. In Preyer, M. Ulkan, A. Ulfig Hrsg., *Intention, Bedeutung, Kommunikation. Kognitive und Handlungstheoretische Grundlagen der Sprachtheorie, Kognitive und handlungstheoretische Grundlagen der Sprachtheorie*, Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag 1997, free to download: *Academia.edu* under Preyer, *unit* Action, Intention, Communication.

⁶ The use of the expression „context“ is often a little bit confused, because it mixes *context* and *situation*. Kaplan distinguishes between "occasion of use" and "possible circumstances of evaluation of what is said on a given occasion of use". Strictly speaking, "context" is a linguistic matter, but situation is not. This is also valid if a situation is defined and we speak about situations under a description. We should not confuse the description and what is described like, for example, in the view of N. Goodman. Goodman's relativism makes the old failure of an ontological idealism of G. Berkeley.

⁷ Borg, *Pursuing Meaning*, p. 47. Preyer, *Kognitive Semantik*, pp. 74-138, on the theoretical assumption of the lexicon, p. 75, on meaning relations, pp. 82-88. In Preyer, M. Ulkan, A. Ulfig (Hrsg.). *Intention –*

The so-called “Old Testament” argues that “the meaning of an expression supervenes on the expression’s relation to things in the world”; on the contrary, the “New Testament” is that “the meaning of an expression supervenes on expression’s role in a language”.⁸ The first argues:

1. meaning is compositional,
2. but inferential roles are not compositional, and
3. therefore meaning cannot be inferential roles.

The latter is holistic, and identifies the meaning of an expression with its inferential role in a given language which goes along denying the analytic/synthetic distinction, because inferential relations determine the meaning of an expression.

3. *Problems.* Firstly, I discuss E. Borg’s consequences of the *schism* in the philosophy of language and semantics which is initiated by H. Cappelen’s / E. Lepore’s turn to Insensitive Semantics. Within this schism Borg has asked us, “Is minimalism minimal enough?”.⁹ The question is initiated by Cappelen’s/Lepore’s “context-shifting argument” (CSA). The answer for this question is the response of the opponents of semantic minimalism — with this, Borg makes a new turn *within* the *schism*. This is of relevance in principle, because answering the question “Is minimalism minimal enough?” there is no route to the situation in the philosophy of language before the *schism*.

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⁸ Fodor, Lepore, *The Compositionality Papers*, pp. 10-11.

⁹ Borg, *Minimalism versus Contextualism in Semantics*, pp. 339-359. In Preyer, Peter eds., *Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism*.

Secondly, I turn to the surprising result which is initiated by the response of Borg's to the opponents of minimalism as a consequence of the recognition that semantic content is not affected by speech acts, because this is the breaking point between Insensitive Semantics and its opponents. This leads to the overall question in the philosophy of language and semantics: what is the relation between communication and interpretation? We come to this question, because the deepest problem of semantics is to explain "how is communication possible?". I am looking back to a more covered problem in the philosophy of language, that is, what are propositions and why doesn't Tarski give a conceivable answer of the understanding of truth? This leads me back to the power of minimalism and to what I call "minimal moderate semantics", which makes a further turn within the *schism* against the opponents of minimalism. It is a turn which is "minimal enough". Thereby the so-called *problem of indexicality* is taken into account. The *bridge principle* between the limited set of indexicals is introduced to solve Borg's problem of limitation within the set of indexicals. Further research on this kind of subject would be desirable.¹⁰

1. Being in the schism

1. *The schism.* Cappelen/Lepore has initiated a *schism* in the philosophy of language and semantics which has taken effect in the contemporary scene.¹¹ We can exemplify the happened *schism* in the philosophy of language and semantics on the characterization of the relation between semantic content and speech act content. Theorists of language

¹⁰ Lepore, M. Stone, *Imagination and Convention. Distinguishing Grammar and Inference in Language*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014 has gone in this direction.

¹¹ Cappelen, Lepore, *Insensitive Semantics*.

presuppose in their “ordinary science” that there are languages which can be analysed using the principle of compositionality, that is, the principle that the semantic values of words contribute something to the semantic value of sentences and complex expressions. Semantics is a scientific discipline which describes the semantic value of lexical entries and their contribution to the semantic values of complex expressions and sentences within which these occur. Its subject is “linguistic meaning”.¹² The principle of compositionality is not disputed, but the problem is whether to handle it atomistically or holistically. Therefore we ask: how strong is the application of compositionality?¹³

2. *Context intuition.* If we want to recognize what a utterance means, then the constraint is the characterization of the meaning of the speech acts of the speaker, that is, what matches sounds to meaning. In finding the meaning of a utterance, we have to take into account not only particular information about the speaker, but also information about the audience and conditions of the situation of acting which make the doings meaningful, successful or not. But this is a trivial statement about the antecedence condition of linguistic research, because we have to understand the meaning of the uttered sentence(-s) first, before we specify or modify the theoretical description of the literal meaning of any uttered sentence. Minimalism therefore argues: if we accept this description about the goal of semantics, then there is no reason to accept the CSA or other versions of a theory that assumes context intuitions of the semantic content as being an “a priori

¹² On “context independent meaning”, “the meaning that is constant across all context of use”, “timeless meaning”, “meaning-in-the language”, and “the meaning of the linguistic type of the utterance” as distinguished from “what is conveyed in a context”, “the meaning of the speech act being performed”, or “the meaning of the *token* being uttered”, P. Pagin, F. J. Pelletier, *Content, Context, and Composition*, pp. 24-25. In Preyer, Peter eds. *Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism*.

¹³On this question, with respect to a compositional meaning theory as the initial project of Davidson truth-theoretical semantics, Lepore, Ludwig, Donald Davidson. *Meaning, Truth, Language, and Reality*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 2005, Part I, in particular, 6 Davidson’s Extensionalist Proposal, pp. 92-146.

constraint” of a semantic theory and interpretation of linguistic behaviour in general.¹⁴

(a) *Minimalism*

1. *Borg’s minimalism.* Borg has systemized the definition of situation of the initiated *schism* from its inside by minimal semantics and has evaluated the consequence which is followed from the emerged turn in philosophy of language and semantics as a department of the philosophy of mind. The turn is done within the *schism* through a modification of Cappelen/Lepore initial proposal. It should be borne in mind that formal semantics means that there is a level of content which is propositional or truth/fulfilment-evaluable and is grasped by the literal meaning of sentences of natural language.¹⁵

Borg-minimalism accepts:

1. semantic content of declarative sentences is a truth/fulfilment-evaluable content, and
2. in natural language there is a limited number of context-sensitive expressions. The extension is
3. semantic content of a sentence is determined by its syntactic structure and lexical content, that is, the meaning of the sentence is given by the meaning of its parts along with their modes of composition, and

¹⁴ This is the initial turn of Cappelen, Lepore, *Insensitive Semantics*, Ch. 2 Exegesis: The Methodology of Contextualism, pp. 17-38, Ch. 3 The Instability of Context Shifting Arguments, pp. 39-52, Ch. 7 Objections to Radical Contextualism (1): Fails Context Sensitivity Test, pp. 87-122. Cappelen, Lepore argue that Moderate Contextualism collapses into Radical Contextualism.

¹⁵ On a general fulfilment approach, Ludwig, *The Truth about Moods*, pp. 133-181. In Preyer, G. Peter, Ulkan (eds.), *Concepts of Meaning. Framing an Integrated Theory of Linguistic Behavior*, Kluwer Publishers, Philosophical Studies Series Vol. 92 2003. Springer: Wien 2012 (second edition), Lepore, Ludwig, *Donald Davidson’s Truth-Theoretic Semantics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007, pp. 276-282.

4. semantic content is not dependent upon any intention of the speaker; this is also true from the interpreter's point of view: there is no mind reading, but only word reading.¹⁶

2. *Limitation problem.* Borg argues that the limitation of minimalism is one of its basic assumptions, that is, that the limited set of lexico-syntactical entries delimitates minimalism with respect to speech act pluralism. This is her turn within the *schism*.

This turn is initiated by Cappelen and Lepore,¹⁷ who accept such principles with reference to D. Kaplan's¹⁸ list of context sensitive expressions, indexical expressions, personal pronouns and demonstrative pronouns such as, for example, "that", "this", the adverbs "here", "now", "today", "yesterday", "tomorrow" and "ago". For example "ago" in "He left two days ago", "hence/forth", for example, in "There will be no talking henceforth", "ago", for example, in "He left two days ago", and the adjective "actual" and "present". They are to complete by common adjectives, like, for example, "foreign", "local", "domestic", and "national". Cappelen/Lepore call this expressions "*basic set of context sensitive expressions*" (and "*set of genuinely context sensitive expressions*"¹⁹). We may ask "why are not, for example, "good", "red", and "duck" context sensitive expressions?". Kaplan has not reasoned his introduction of the list of context sensitive expressions, but Cappelen/Lepore defends the non-contaminated intuition of Kaplan's methodology (against many objections), that is, their view of the "role of context sensitivity in the semantics for

¹⁶ Borg, *Pursuing Meaning*, pp. 4-5.

¹⁷ Cappelen, Lepore, *Insensitive Semantics*, pp. 1-2.

¹⁸ D. Kaplan, *Demonstratives*, pp. 481-504 In *Themes from Kaplan*, edited by J. Almog, J. Perry & H. Wettstein. Oxford GB: Oxford University Press 1977.

¹⁹ Cappelen, Lepore, *Insensitive Semantics*, p. 2.

natural language”.²⁰ Cappelen/Lepore divides “radical” and “moderate contextualists” along the line the number of expressions whether *all* or *less* expressions are context sensitive. Borg argues that under this distinction the radical contextualists are actually the ones they are referring to. She turns to another line of distinction between the camps: the question is not “how many expressions are context-sensitive?”, but rather “what mechanisms are context-sensitive?”.²¹

Borg agrees with Cappelen/Lepore about the limitation of indexicals, but the question is “Is minimalism minimal enough?”. It is obvious that the question is initiated by Cappelen’s and Lepore’s turn to minimalism, because interpreting semantic content does not need “a lot” of pragmatics, but interpreting *what is said* by a utterance needs “a lot”. Therefore there is a gap between the analysis of semantic content and understanding *saying* which minimalists cannot accept. The problem is not to be solved with formal means alone. I will return to this question in Section 2(d) and (e), below.

Borg argues that terms such as “radical contextualism” (Travis, Searle, Recanati and the relevance theorists like, for example, Wilson and Carston), “moderate contextualism” (Stanley and Szabo), “context sensitivity of quantified phrases” (Richard and Perry) or “belief statements” and “epistemic claims” (for example, DeRose) do not divide the camps of minimalists and contextualists.²² Borg argues that “moderate contextualism”

²⁰ Cappelen, Lepore, *Insensitive Semantics*, p. 2.

²¹ Borg, *Minimalism versus Contextualism in Semantics*, p. 345. In Preyer, Peter eds., *Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism*.

²² Borg, *Minimalism versus Contextualism in Semantics*, pp. 339-359. In Preyer, Peter eds., *Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism*. Borg, *Minimal Semantics, on dual pragmatics*, pp. 37-52, on relevance theory (Sperber, Wilson, pp. 40-44), contextualism (Recanati), pp. 44-48, both agree about what Borg calls “dual pragmatics” (Sperber, Wilson, Carston, and Recanati). Dual pragmatics assumes a primary dependency of truth-condition or propositional contents from the context of speech acts, that is, an underdetermination of “saying that” by the formal analysis, on the dispute between formal semantics and dual pragmatics, pp. 37-39. 52-62. The primary pragmatic process is “saturation” (Recanati), on “discourse

is characterized by the assumption that “all context sensitivity mirrors are to be found amongst members of the Basic Set”, thereby denying the Basic-Set assumption that these theories are not minimalist because they share the minimalist’s turn of the syntactic path to semantic content. Radical contextualism claims to reject the last turn in semantics.²³

3. *Context-shifting argument.* The *schism* is made obvious by the responses to Cappelen/Lepore’s CSA. If you imagine utterances such as, for example, “Peter is tall,” then an interpreter in a particular speech situation may be referring to a two-year-old child or, in another situation, to a basketball player. The truth-value about *what is said* switches, depending on the situation of the speech acts. CSA claims to show that the truth-value does not switch between different speech situations.

4. *Initial situation.* Borg identifies *within* the initial situation of the *schism* a consequence that answers the CSA.

1. The responses to CSA are “indexicalism”, “contextualism”, “relativism”, and “occasionalism”.²⁴ Borg’s view is: the best policy is often to make a compromise with respect to the intermediate positions between minimalism and occasionalism, but she claims to show that these positions are unstable. Within the *schism*, it is significant to consider which of the arguments are brought into play against minimalism. This initiates the recognition of the situation of the disagreement among the theorists of language.

representation theory” (Kamp), pp. 49-52. The camp of dual pragmaticists haven’t proceeded Katz, Propositional Structure and illocutionary Force.

²³ Borg, Minimalism versus Contextualism in Semantics, p. 346. In Preyer, Peter eds., Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism.

²⁴ Borg, Pursuing Meaning, capt. 1 (3), p. 4, on a overview Figure 2, pp. 72.

2. Borg's argumentation strategy is that the arguments against minimalism are helpful in redescribing the present *schism* with respect to a strong turn against the opposite accounts.

3. Borg's version of "minimalism" is the consequence of semantic minimalism which is contrary to the "occasionalism" (Travis' later Wittgensteinism) that lies on the other side of the accounts of linguistic meaning, because the Minimalism view is: the utterance of the sentence *Peter is tall* has a semantic content which is not changed in different speech situations, but the utterance meaning is a matter of speaker intention. This distinction preserves Borg-minimalism.

4. Therefore Minimalism argues: in grasping the semantic content of the uttered sentence, the word meaning has a *priority* without adding speaker intention and knowledge about the situation. This, specifically, is the break between Minimalism and its opponents:

* Minimal semantics should be distinguished from all pragmatic issues in the theory of language (for example, Recanati's "truth conditional pragmatics" and his "Availability Principle"²⁵), because minimalism claims to show that every theory of language has to accept that there is a *level of content* (what is said) which is determined by word meaning and syntactic structure as well.

This is invariant with respect to the issue of the intended meaning of speech acts in varied situations. Without considering literary meaning, we cannot understand and learn a natural language. But this requirement also includes

²⁵ F. Recanati, *Direct Reference*. From Language to Thought, Oxford: Blackwell 1993. The "Availability Principle" is: "In deciding whether a pragmatically determined aspect of utterance meaning is part of what is said, that is, in making a decision concerning what is said, we should always try to preserve our pre-theoretic intuition of the matter," p. 248, on Truth-conditional pragmatics, pp. 233-254.

the assumption that propositional content itself is given by situations of awareness, observation, referring, acting and communicating. This is traditionally called the domain of pragmatics. The question is that minimalism argues that we should introduce (1) a “purely lexico-syntactic level” and (2) a “necessarily propositional sentence-level content”. But it is not argued that every speech act has a propositional content.

5. Therefore the conclusion of the opponents against minimalism argues:

- (a) a minimal level of truth-conditional content it is not necessary, that is, a minimal proposition is explanatorily redundant, and
- (b) in some cases, the lexico-syntactically determined content has no effect in our speech occasions. This is, for them, the argument that there are no minimal propositions.²⁶

(b) Indexicalism

1. *Indexicalism* is a middle position between, but distinct from, both *minimalism* and *occasionalism*.²⁷ Minimalism shares with indexicalism the idea that semantic content is propositional and is determined by lexico-syntactic form. But contrary to minimalism, indexicalism argues that there is a switch of the truth-value in CSA that is semantically based on our *intuitive judgement* about the semantic content. This takes effect in the lexico-syntactical composition of sentences as a rejection of minimalism.²⁸

²⁶ Borg, *Pursuing Meaning*, chapt. 1; on differences between Borg and Cappelen, Lepore: Borg, *Pursuing Meaning*, p. 4, footnote 2, p. 3, Chapter 2 § 6, Chapter 3.

²⁷ Borg calls indexicalism what is often called contextualism, for example, K. DeRose, Contextualism and Knowledge Attribution. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 52, 1992: pp. 913-929, epistemic contextualism which is an epistemic indexicalism. What Cappelen/Lepore calls contextualism names Borg indexicalism, Borg, *Pursuing Meaning*, p. 19, footnote 19.

²⁸ Borg, *Pursuing Meaning*, with reference to J. Stanley, Nominal Restriction, pp. 365-388. In Preyer, Peter eds. *Logical Form and Language*, Oxford: Oxford University York 2002, Stanley, Semantics and Context, pp. 221-254. In Preyer, Peter eds., *Contextualism in Philosophy, the hidden indexical view* D. Rothschild,

2. The *difference* between *contextualism*, *relativism*, and *occasionalism* is that *indexicalism* goes along with *minimalism*, because it accepts a prior lexico-syntactic interpretation of semantic content.

The reinterpretation of *hidden indexical expressions* in the domain of context-sensitive terms is not a contradiction to minimalism.²⁹

3. *Minimalism* and *occasionalism* agree that this does not work in all cases.³⁰

4. Borg's turn is that the question of indexicalism takes CSA seriously, but not seriously enough, because there is *more* than a limit class of indexicals. The turn handles the CSA by using syntactic structure. This is motivated by the postulation of *hidden indexicals*, because grasping intuitions about the switched meaning by CSA is reasoned thereby.³¹

Therefore Borg concludes that taking CSA seriously then hits upon contextualism of semantic content generally.

(c) *Contextualism*

1. *Gricean implicature*. *Contextualism* claims to reject in particular that semantic content is determinate prior to the lexico-syntactic component.³² Cappelen/Lepore makes the distinction between moderate and radical contextualism. The first argues that some expressions are context-sensitive and the last assumes that all expressions in natural

G. Segal, *Indexical Predicates*. *Mind and Language* 24 2009: 467-493, J. Hawthorne, *Knowledge and Lotteries*. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004, Stanley, *Semantics and Context*, pp. 221-254. In Preyer, Peter eds., *Contextualism in Philosophy*.

²⁹ On the rejection of the indexicality approach of Cappelen/Lepore, *Insensitive Semantics*, Borg, *Pursuing Meaning*, p. 31.

³⁰ C. Travis, *Occasion-Sensitivity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008, p. 115, the parameter of "I" is that the speaker refers to himself and "now" he refers to a time-point as a part of the meaning of the expressions. On J. Stanley, *Context and Logical Form*, *Linguistic and Philosophy* 23 2000, pp. 391-424, Borg, *Pursuing Meaning*, 32-34, on J. Collins, *Syntax, more or less*, *Mind* 117 2007, pp. 805-850, Borg, *Pursuing Meaning*, 33-34, on S. Neale, *Heavy hands, Magic, and Scene-Reading Traps*, *European Journal of Analytic Philosophy* 3 2007, pp. 77-132, Borg, *Pursuing Meaning*, pp. 34-35.

³¹ Borg, *Pursuing Meaning*, p. 31.

³² Borg's definition of contextualism fits also in the turn of relevance theory as an example of contextualism, R. Carston, *Thoughts and Utterances*, Cambridge GB 2002.

language are context-sensitive. The difference between minimalism and contextualism is about the number of context-sensitive expressions and not about mechanisms of context-sensitivity.³³

The contextualist's view is that the standard account handle context-sensitivity is misleading, for example, within the Kaplan-Perry framework. Every propositional-like speech act which is literally express has to take in a pragmatic feature by Gricean implicatures or relativized the speech act content to the situation of utterance.³⁴

2. *Context-sensitive-lexico-syntactic components.* The switch in CSA is done also without context-sensitive-lexico-syntactic components. Borg uses the expression "free pragmatic enrichment" characterizing the pragmatic enrichments by the CSA, for example, *Peter is tall* specified to *Peter is tall and a basketball player*; the expressed proposition requires no demand by any lexico-syntactic component.

The critique on formal semantic is, for example, that there is a semantic underdetermination which claims to reject the primary truth-evaluative interpretation of sentences, because utterances like, for example, „Jim will continue (with what?)“, „The apple is red (on the surface)“, „Miller weighs 120 kg (with dress)“ requires additional pre-, inter- and post-semantic information. Therefore the unarticulated constituents are not to recognize from the syntactic constituents.³⁵

3. *Semantic underdetermination.* The critique on formal semantic is, for example, that there is a semantic underdetermination which claims to

³³ Borg, *Pursuing Meaning*, on Cappelen/Lepore, p. 22, Note 18.

³⁴ Carston, *Thoughts and Utterances*, F. Recanati, *Literal Meaning*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004.

³⁵ Borg *Minimal Semantics*, pp. 34-35, 210, 213-214, 226-227.

reject the primary truth-evaluative interpretation of sentences, because utterances like, for example, „Jim will continue (with what?)“, „The apple is red (on the surface)“, „Miller weighs 120 kg (with dress)“ requires additional pre-, inter- and post-semantic information. Therefore the *unarticulated constituents* are not to recognize from the syntactic constituents.

This critique is a *weaker* one if we take in the components of the „sub-syntactic“ level. The lexical entries, for example, for transitive verbs, have two argument-places. If the surface form of a sentence utterance has one argument place, so the other place is guaranteed by the sub-syntactic form. The lexical entry of “kick” has one argument place for the agent and for an object. It has the form of a relation „x kicks y“. If the description on the surface has one argument only, for example, „Jürgen kicks“ so the description of the syntactic level contributes the second argument place by the existence bounded variable “Peter kicks something” or argument place “ $\exists x$ Peter kicks x’”.³⁶

Borg’s strategy is to show that the theoretical commitment from formal, syntax-based route to semantics is the fundamental assumption of *minimalism*. Therefore the *hidden indexicals* are not fundamental for understanding a language.³⁷ The strategy is to exemplify that Minimal Semantics has the “weapons” to answer their opponents.

4. *Speech acts and context relation*. The *relevance theory* as the opponent of *minimalists* argues that the literal content of a speech act refers to a context-relation, that is, all semantic content is a *pragmatic* issue.³⁸ This

³⁶ Borg, *Minimal Semantics*, pp. 225-46, on critique of liberal truth conditions, p. 231-46.

³⁷ Cappelen, *Semantics and Pragmatics: Some Central Issues*, pp. 7-8. In Preyer, Peter, *Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism*.

³⁸ D. Sperber, D. Wilson, *Relevance: Communication and Cognition*, Oxford: Blackwell 1986, Carston, *Thoughts and Utterances*, F. Recanati, *Literal Meaning*.

new contextualists stance is the challenge of *traditional semantics* and *minimalism*.

5. *Basic problem.* The *conclusion* about the changes situation within the *schism* is: the *schism* is initiated about the semantic fruitfulness of the distinction between *what is said* and *what is implicated* (H. P. Grice) as basic theory of semantics.³⁹ Within the *schism* is happened the *theoretical situation* between *minimalists* and their opponents that the varieties of *indexicalism* and *semantic relativism* are the consequence from the challenge which is initiated by *Insensitive Semantics* (Cappelen/Lepore 2005).⁴⁰

(d) *Semantic Relativism*

1. *Agreement.* *Minimalism* and *semantic relativism* agree about (non-indexical) sentences express propositions. But the difference is relativism takes proposition as true or false by contextual parameter only. Relativism is near by “indexicalism”, but is a more radical account along the Kaplan-Perry-style, that is, sentences are true or false by context of the uttered speech act. Every propositional content is limited by context-sensitive expressions. Borg distinguishes as exemplification between “eternalism” and “temporalism”. The first includes time-points in the propositional content, for example, <Peter, tall, *t* 1>; the same sentence in different times expresses other propositions. The second turns to that propositional content is itself timeless, for example, the both utterances <Peter, tall> express the same proposition and the difference is the evaluation from the time-points. Borg

³⁹ Borg, *Minimal Semantics*, 108-36; on Implicatures, pp. 131-36.

⁴⁰ J. MacFarlane, *Semantic minimalism and Nonindexical Contextualism*, pp. 240-250. In Preyer, Peter eds., *Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism*, S. Predelli, Contexts. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005, M. Kölble, *Motivations for Relativism*, pp. 1-40. In M. Gracia-Carpineto, M. Köbel eds., *Relative Truth*. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008 and others.

notes that both come to the same results, but for the second is not the time-indicator a part of the propositional content. Therefore there is an endless number of parameters recognizing the relevant proposition and one proposition is true in one speech situation and false in another.⁴¹

2. *Speaker reference*. Another version of relativism is adding the reference to the speaker to the uttered proposition. In this case we do not add public factors to the uttered proposition, for example, *Peter is tall* for me or for you the uttered proposition may be true for me and false for you. The propositional content is therefore not only relative to switched context, but within the internal features of the speech situation. The result of the evaluation of proposition is not different from indexicalism and contextualism.⁴²

(e) *Occasionalism*

1. *Agreement*. *Minimalism* and *occasionalism* agree about that *contextualism* is the wrong track.⁴³ But occasionalism taking CSA as a reason rejecting the standard view of propositional content. The overall question of contextualism is that sentences express an incomplete content by the lexico-syntactic constituents. Occasionalism goes along with contextualism and relativism, but argues for a very different approach of meaning: there is no determined content of sentences outside contexts inspired from the late Wittgenstein.⁴⁴ Travis' view is that for language and

⁴¹ Borg, *Pursuing Meaning*, p. 24.

⁴² Borg, *Pursuing Meaning*, pp. 25-26.

⁴³ Travis, *The Uses of Sense: Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Language*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1989, p. 23.

⁴⁴ Travis, *The Uses of Sense: Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Language*, Oxford GB 1989, J. Dancy, *Ethic without Principles*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004, p. 197.

thought there is a underdetermination of representation in principle.⁴⁵ Words have sense in speech situations only. But Travis does not contradict that standard lexical entries works for expression, for example, “green” means green and therefore there are semantic contributions for the meaning of a word in a larger context.⁴⁶ But minimalism differs from occasionalism thereby that the semantic content is itself a truth-evaluable one.

2. *Word meaning and use.* Prima vista occasionalism also turns to a priority of word meaning as the elementary unit forming sentences and some words like ‘I’ and ‘that’ fix their context-reference of context utterances. But occasionalism makes another turn, because the word meaning is fixed by context references of the speaker’s use, that is, there is no context independent meaning of their propositional contribution of the uttered sentences.

3. *Determination.* On contraire to occassionalism: minimalism argues word meaning determines sentence meaning. The assumptions about word meaning leads us to rest of all understanding sentences, speech acts and utterances:

1. the meaning of the sentence is determinated by the meaning of the words, and
2. words are marked at the lexical/syntactic level along to the same semantic category, that is, this is valid as overtly context-sensitive expressions like ‘I’ and ‘that’.

⁴⁵ From Cappelen/Lepore view is Travis a proponent of a radical contextualism. Borg paired Travis to a strong Wittgensteinism and not to contextualism, because for him there is not something like a lexicolinguistic *content*.

⁴⁶ Borg, *Pursuing Meaning*, pp. 45-46.

Minimalism rejects all account which assume there is no context-invariant content which is evaluable by truth. This account is the contrary positions to all semantic occasionalism/broadly Wittgensteinian account, for example, that is, all content is determined by the context and the use of language, that is, we cannot break out the language games.

4. *Conclusion.* Minimalism concludes: the argument against occasionalism is to generalize.⁴⁷ One may argue as the turn of all contextualists, for example, ‘tall’ for a *four-year-old* in one context and has another meaning in *tall for a basketball player* and the forth. Therefore the content is richer than minimalists assume in general. Every speaker has to match their intuitions about the uttered sentences and their communicative intent. Borg calls that the “argument from below”. Therefore the argument is: a semantic theory does not encode something like proposition, minimal or not.

(f) *Propositionalism and Anti-Propositionalism*

1. *Truth-evaluable content.* Within the *schism* Borg makes the turn to propositionalism, that is, proposition as truth-evaluable content, is not to give up as an answer of indexicalism, contextualism, and anti-propositionalism. Therefore speaker intentions are “*verboden*” at the semantic level of interpretation.⁴⁸ The department of the philosophy of mind connects therefore semantic content with the Fodor-modularity of

⁴⁷ Borg, *Pursuing Meaning*, chapt. 5 - 6.

⁴⁸ Borg, *Pursuing Meaning*, p. 13.

mind.⁴⁹ Formal, syntactic structure delivers the content and explains the productivity and systematicity of natural languages.

2. *Non-propositionalism*. Another response to minimalism is K. Bach anti-propositionalism is: not all well-formed sentence, specified to the context of utterance expresses a *proposition*, therefore propositionalism is obvious false.⁵⁰ Thereby the situation is given that without propositionalism the theory of interpretation works on the mentioned two level:

1. one level which take in the non-propositional content feature and
2. the other pragmatic level which determinates every propositional content by the so-called use of language.

3. *Challenge*. Therefore the challenge of minimalism is:

1. minimal propositions are not necessary, that is, they have no explanatory function and
2. these propositions are impossible, that is, the most or all natural languages sentences do not express complete truth-evaluable content formed by lexico-syntactic component.⁵¹

To 3 (a): Borg argues against the claim

1. minimal proposition are explanatory redundant and
2. against the non-existence of minimal proposition.

⁴⁹ Borg, *Minimal Semantics*, on modular theory, pp. 74-146.

⁵⁰ K. Bach, *The Excluded Middle: Minimal Semantics without Minimal Proposition*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 73 2007, pp. 435-442.

⁵¹ Borg, *Pursuing Meaning*, p. 48, on the first question, capt. 2, on the second, capt. 3-6.

3. Therefore it is to show that minimal propositions work usefully.⁵²

Minimalism argues that the semantic content is determined by syntax and lexicon which is not context-sensitive. Therefore there is no “strong pragmatic effect” of semantic content.

Borg’s argument against the explanatory role of minimal proposition (3 (a) 1.) is motivated from the point of view that in the speech situation within the speaker utters, for example, *the steak is raw*, the intended meaning (speech act content) is not limited by any minimal proposition.⁵³ Therefore Borg turns to the *general framework* within semantics and psychology is related.

The question is that a speaker may say ‘It is a lovely day’ with an ironical intent and means it is a horrible day!?. Is (3 (a) 2.) an argument against an reinterpretation by ‘what is *literally* said’ firstly?⁵⁴ Are intuitive judgement helpful to solve the shop of interpretation? The question is that there are no intuition which can distinguish between the literal meaning and the speaker meaning or the utterance meaning of the plurality of intended forces of speech acts. Therefore minimalism has distinguished between the

⁵² Borg, *Pursuing Meaning*, capt. 2 – 3.

⁵³ This is in particular Recanati’s Literal Meaning argument of the “availability principle”, p. 20 which claims to establish an intuitively access of intelligible redescription about what is said. On critique on Grice-implicatures as a rational reconstruction, Bach, *The Top Ten Misconceptions about Implicature*, p. 25. In B. Birner, G. Ward (eds.), *Drawing the Boundaries of Meaning: Neo-Gricean Studies in Pragmatics and Semantics in Honor of Laurence R. Horn*, Amsterdam: John Benjamins 2006, Borg, *Pursuing Meaning*, pp. 64-63, on Grice-implicature Cappelen, Cappelen, *Semantics and Pragmatics: Some Central Issues*, pp. 9-20, In Preyer, Peter eds., *Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism*. There is a simple argument against Grice-implicature: we can cancel it without any substitute. M. Platts, *Ways of Meaning. An Introduction to a Philosophy of Language*, London: Routledge, pp. 74-86, he also argues “..., unaided intuition fails to distinguish meaning implications and conversational implicatures; for it fails to distinguish improprieties of meaning and conversational one”, p. 74. In this direction also argues R. M. Kempson, *Semantic Theory*, Cambridge Textbooks in Linguistics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1977, pp. 71-72, pp. 68-72.

⁵⁴ Borg, *Pursuing Meaning*, pp. 50-51. Borg’s argues it seems that for Griceians and minimalists there is a comparable turn that there is dependence between semantic content and mind. The intended content of the speaker cannot explain the semantic meaning of sentences. On metaphysical and epistemic dependence between contents and mind, pp. 54-56.

literal/linguistic meaning of sentence utterances and speech act pluralism as well as accepts minimal proposition.

To 3 (a) 2: Borg's turn toward this challenge is that "incomplete expressions" do not show that propositionalism is to give up.⁵⁵ She makes another turn handling this problem as Cappelen/Lepore, because she does not go along with their "slippery slope" argument, that is, if the "incompleteness argument" is an evidence for a moderate contextualism a radical contextualism is to conclude.⁵⁶ The collapsing into a radical contextualism is reasoned by the acceptance of incompleteness intuitions as relevant fixing the meaning of the sentence in question.

Borg's question is: if we allow intuitions of incompleteness about the indication on the semantic status of sentences then there is no reason for the situate affected content by syntactical structure.⁵⁷ Therefore Borg argues: "no context-sensitivity without clear lexico-syntactic evidence of context-sensitivity".⁵⁸ Minimalism (1) does not give reference-fixing/identification as theoretical constraint of semantics and (2) claims at the same time to specify the semantic content.⁵⁹

(g) Minimalism and Chomsky-internalism

1. *Chomsky's argument.* Minimalists agree with Chomsky about that the "non-trivial internalist account" in semantics, that is, we require intra-linguistic and not world-world connections.⁶⁰ But Chomsky argues from

⁵⁵ Borg, *Pursuing Meaning*, capt. 3.

⁵⁶ Cappelen/Lepore, *Insensitive Semantics*, 63, Borg, *Pursuing Meaning*, pp. 82-83.

⁵⁷ Borg, *Pursuing Meaning*, pp. 87-88.

⁵⁸ Borg, *Pursuing Meaning*, p. 88.

⁵⁹ Borg, *Minimal Semantics*, *Pursuing Meaning*, on the non-propositional content of declarative sentences, capt. 3, 5, 6.

⁶⁰ N. Chomsky, *New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000. This is also in harmony M. D. Hauser, Chomsky, W. T. Fitch, *The Faculty of Language: What is it, Who has it, and how did it evolve?*, *Science's Compass* Vol. 298 2002, pp. 1569-1579, with respect to

the ‘argument from below’ that words in general have not a context-independent, world-involving contribution to a larger linguistic units.

1. There is no referential lexical axioms, for example, “London’ refers to London’ like minimalism assumes, and
2. world-involving lexical axioms are irrelevant for a semantic theory.

Borg argues in contrary that a part of the word of a successful semantic theory going the step from syntax to semantics is a referential semantic.⁶¹

2. *Borg’s rejection.* Borg claims to reject the idea a lexicon is only a list of word-denotations thereby the meaning of words are structured complex entities.⁶² She gives an answer of the “*intra-linguistic* burden for semantics”, that is, systemizing the properties of and relation among expressions with respect to their relation to the non-linguistic external world.⁶³ Her turn is to a “organizational lexical semantics” which can handle putatively incomplete expressions.⁶⁴ The “lexical semantics” works by

1. distinguishing three categories of expressions one argument place like “dance”, two argument place like “devour”, and lexical expressions which are associated with lexical information thereby an two-place-term expression is classified like “ready”,

the status of human language. No animal can learn this language. Borg, *Pursuing Meaning*, pp. 146-156, on the rejection of the argument against word meaning, pp.156-164.

⁶¹ P. Pietroski, *Meaning before Truth*, pp. 255-302. In Preyer, Peter eds., *Contextualism in Philosophy*.

⁶² Borg, *Pursuing Meaning*, p. 88, on “organisational lexical semantics,” pp. 195-213, on “Lexical semantics,” pp. 176-180, on “Inferential role semantics,” pp. 180-183 which is criticized by Fodor and Lepore, on Fodor and Lepore’s objections to lexical complexity, pp. 183-191.

⁶³ Borg, *Pursuing Meaning*, pp. 166-167.

⁶⁴ Borg, *Pursuing Meaning*, pp. 195-213.

2. it is an option that two place arguments required by “read” can realize differently within the lexicon.

The conclusion is that atomistic picture of word meaning is well reasoned towards their opponent indexicalism, contextualism, relativism and occasionalism.

2. After the schism

(a) *Understanding communication and interpretation*

1. *Pre-history.* The happened *schism* has a long pre-history. The semantic minimalism rejects the tradition in the philosophy of language which goes back to Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations* and the speech act theory of J. L. Austin, the relevance theory of Sperber and Wilson, Carston, Recanati, some Neo-Wittgensteinians and some Sellarians, but also the theory of language of Searle and Travis. In particular Travis—not Searle—stands in the Wittgenstein tradition explicitly.⁶⁵ These accounts are false in principle.

The *schism* is caused about the role of context insensitivity in the theory of communication in principle. It is the test of the philosophy of language to give us evidence about *how* the distinction between semantic and non-semantic content is made. The problem of communication is: how do we communicate about a cross context in cases where people have

⁶⁵ Austin has not introduced his speech act theory as a continuation of the late Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations* which he holds for confused. It is handed down that he talked about the “*Investigations*” as “dead literature”.

different background beliefs, goals, audiences and the on, that is, the theory of communication has to explain how this work?

2. *Saying/... the same.* The understanding of the communicative intent of a speaker uttering of speech acts requires more as the recognition of the meaning of expressions and sentences in a language really, for example, the behaviour of groups, the folk psychology and sociology, and the every day life physics. But without *saying, intending, meaning, thinking*, but also *feeling the same*, communication would not be possible. If we assume the power of the modular theory then the theory of meaning which assume basic communicative intents is unfounded. Both are a result of different processes in principle. Therefore a formal semantics suggests a demoralized limitation of its domain, because a formal semantics has a little set of information for the access which a member of a linguistic community has in the most case securing his communicative intent. But the minimalists emphasize that just this limited domain is the hard core of minimalism, because the theoretical structure of compositionality is constitutive for natural languages. This is the question of the so-called “nature” of language. The opponents of minimalism which argue that meaning is similar the use of language assume that the complexity of the use of language and understanding a language requires assumptions about the behaviour of speaker and the reasoning of his action which are to take in the semantic analysis. If we do not deny that then the minimalism view is that a formal semantics and the modularity give us a basic theoretical description of understanding languages.

3. *Rearrangement of the theory of interpretation.* It is the consequence of minimal semantic that the theory of interpretation is rearranged. Looking

back in the history of philosophy of the last century it is to conclude that the basic theories of radical translation (Quine) and radical translation (Davidson) are to give up, because they have not given conceivable constraints of interpretation. Minimalism view is that the both theoretical accounts the formal truth/fulfilment-condition semantics and the modular theory of mind can work together. The theory of linguistic meaning describes on the basis of a finite set of axioms and the compositionality principle the literal meaning of every sentence of a natural language. This works without the reference to speaker intentions. The modular theory makes the assumption that the mind consists of discrete and relative autonomous modules with different operation rules (structure). An appropriate modular of a competent speaker works for the understanding linguistic behaviour. The turn in the theory of interpretation is that the intelligible redescription is not contaminated on the ground by theories.⁶⁶

(b) Sentence, Statement, Proposition

Minimalism and minimal moderate semantics accepts propositions. Making clear the problem “why propositions?” it is useful to distinguish between *sentence*, *statement*, and *proposition*.⁶⁷ If we make these distinction then we recognize why the dual pragmatic cannot work, because its view does not make these distinctions systematically.

1. *Sentence*. A *sentence* is any grammatical correct and complete string of any natural language composed by a noun and a verb phrase build by

⁶⁶ Borg, Pursuing Meaning, on simulation theory and the mirror neuron hypothesis, 123-126, on theory-theory and body reading, 126-134.

⁶⁷ I refer to the distinction with some extensions S. Haack, Philosophy of Logics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1978, 75-78.

compositionality. Compositionality is a feature of syntax, because a sentence is built of primitive components, words, and morphemes in virtue of the formation rules, and as well of semantics, because the meaning of a sentence is fixed by the meaning of the primitive parts combined with the syntactic structure.

We make the distinction between sentence *type* and sentence *token*. The token is a physical entity, a series of marks on paper and of sound waves as an inscribed or uttered sentence, for example, interrogative, imperative or declarative sentences which are indicated by sentence modes. The last are broader as indicative, because they include also subjunctive conditionals. In the American language are indicative and declarative synonymous. The criterion of identity of the same sentence type is syntactical. Assertives are an instance for truth and directives (advises, imperatives, orders, questions), commissives, declaratives and expressives are an instance for other fulfilment conditions. In this context declarative sentences are not to confuse with the illocutionary act-type, for example, of “declaration” and advise.⁶⁸

2. *Statement*. A *statement* is *what is said* by a uttered or inscribed declarative sentence, that is, saying of ... In the case of a non-technical meaning making statements is ambiguous as utterance event, sentence inscription and content of uttered and ascribed sentence. The question is whether two or more utterance make the same statement, that is, “say the same thing about the same thing”, for example, “You are in grief (said by *x* to *y*), I am in grief (said by *y*), *Ich bin in Trauer* (said by *y*) are the same

⁶⁸ On a critique on Searle’s speech act theoretical and D. Lewis truth-theoretical accounts of moods (declarative, interrogative, and imperative) W. B. Starr, Mood, Force and Truth, ProtoSociology 31 2014: Language and Value. Edited by Yi Jiang and Ernest Lepore, pp. 160-181.

statement or proposition. This is the question of truth-bearer or proposition and the problem is one of synonymy of the sentences.⁶⁹

3. *Proposition.* There are three accounts of *proposition*. Have in mind that extensionalists in logic and epistemology do not accept proposition (Quine, Davidson and others), but we are not committed to this view. For them there are no senses, propositions, properties, relations, Husserl's noema, and the on. The question is: are propositions linguistic, abstract entities or mental constructs?

1. Propositions are a set of synonymous declarative sentences. Therefore two sentences represents the same proposition if their meaning is the same. Like in the case of statements we are faced with the problem of synonymy.⁷⁰

2. The possible-worlds semantics of modal logics, that is, identifying a proposition with the set of possible worlds in which the proposition is true or a function from possible worlds into truth-values. This is a language independent definition of propositions, that is, "If 'Jack and Jill have one parent in common' then the sentence expresses the same proposition as 'Jack and Jill are step-siblings'". In a possible world within the first is true also the second is true and contrary.

3. A different version is that propositions are the content of sentences or illocutionary acts in different moods, for example, "James shut the door, James, shut the door!, Has James shut the door?" express the same proposition James' shutting the door." The so-called propositional content

⁶⁹ Quine's view is: statements cannot be propositions. They are formulas and we associate conditions of their semantic evaluation. On a detailed examination of Quine's holism, Fodor, Lepore, W. V. O. Quine: meaning Holism and Confirmation Holism, pp. 37-58. In Holism. A Shopper's Guide, Cambridge Mass.: Blackwell 1992.

⁷⁰ This is Haack's preference Haack, Philosophy of Logics, pp. 76-77.

is unlikely instance as truth-bearer. A propositional content is anything which is to specify by conditions of fulfilment.

In sum it is obvious: sentences, statements and propositions are distinct, because “one could have same sentence/different statement/different proposition, same statement/different sentence/different proposition, same proposition/different sentence/different statements”.⁷¹ This is a hint of a problem in semantics in principle. But this is not the last word, because the indication of the question whereupon minimalism gives a solution.

(c) Truth and propositions

In particular the Quine-Davidson tradition has claimed to disenchant propositions. The “Flight from intension” (Quine) is the magna charta of this nominalistic semantics. But it is to pose the question again:

why propositions?

1. *Truth and language.* R. Carnap makes the distinction between truth and the knowledge of truth and between the absolute truth and confirmation.⁷² The last is an empirical truth as more or less probable. The knowledge of truth itself is not absolute. The semantic concept of truth in the Tarski-style is to distinguish from an absolute concept of truth. The first is to relativize to a language

1. “True (S, L)”,

⁷¹ Haack, *Philosophy of Logics*, p. 77, R. Cartwright, *Proposition*. In *Analytical Philosophy*, Vol 1, New York 1962.

⁷² R. Carnap, *Introduction in Semantics*, Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press 1942.

that is, the sentence S is true in a language L .

The absolute concept of truth is an one place predicate only “True (p)” only. The values of the variable are not sentences, but propositions.

Carnap defines absolute truth by the semantic concept of truth, that is:

2. “ $T(p) = (L) (S, p, L \text{ true } (S, L))$ ”

– “Des” is a three place relation:

3. “Des (S, p, L)”, that is, S designate the proposition p in L .⁷³

If we accept propositions then this definition is a problematic one, because propositions which are not expressed lingually can be both true and false.⁷⁴

2. *Semantic statement and statements about proposition*. A. Pap has made the following turn. What is the relationship between the semantic statement

4. “‘ p ’ is true” and a statement about a proposition “ $W(p)$ ”?⁷⁵

He compares

5. “ $W(p)$ ”

with the relationship between the statement

⁷³ Carnap, Introduction in Semantics.

⁷⁴ This is the critique of Pap, Analytische Erkenntnistheorie, p. 67, I agree.

⁷⁵ Pap, Analytische Erkenntnistheorie, p. 67, Notes on the “Semantics” and the “Absolute“ Concept of Truth (1953), pp. 148-154, Proposition, Sentences, and the Semantic Definition of Truth (1954), pp. 155-164, 165-179. In The Limits of Logical Empiricism. Ed. by A. Keupink, S. Shieh.

6. “The predicate ‘ P ’ is to apply to x ”

with the statement

7. “ x has the property F ”.

May be x has the property P , but the predicate “ P ” is not apply to x , because it has not the property in question. In consequence Pap concludes that empirical truth is an exemplification of a proposition by certain facts like the exemplification of universals or attributes by individuals. If the assertion of any proposition p is true then it is not yet state which facts make the proposition true. If the proposition “there are red cars on earth” is true then nothing is said about how many cars are red and where are the cars.⁷⁶ The concept of truth is in our ordinary use a non-semantic concept, like the concept of exemplification of attributes and the parts of classes.⁷⁷ The sentences like, for example, “Snow is white is true” or “Snow is white is false” have a content. Therefore there is something what make the sentences true (Armstrong: truth-maker). The sentences themselves are empty.

3. *Truth in Tarski-style*. The question is that the equivalences of the form *Truth* in Tarski-style

8. “Porto is a city in Portugal is true *iff* Porto is a city in Portugal”

⁷⁶ C. A. Bayleis, Facts, Propositions, Exemplification and Truth, pp. 459-479. In *Mind* 57 1948.

⁷⁷ Beside differences Quine and Davidson claim to reject this account in principle. For the theory of meaning no properties, no senses, no propositions, or semantic universals. Davidson argues in particular that we may accept propositions as a matter of decision, but propositions as reifying meaning are not useful, Lepore and Ludwig, Donald Davidson Meaning, Truth, Language, and Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005, capt. 3. On proposition as meanings in sentences with “That clauses” (Noun phrase + verb + that + sentence) Lepore and Ludwig, Donald Davidson Truth-Theoretic Semantics, Oxford GB 2007, capt. 11.

are not necessary true sentences. We may consider without any contradiction that even though Porto is a city in Portugal the sentence

9. “Porto is a city in Portugal”

is not true, because the sentence does not designate the proposition Porto is a city in Portugal, but a false proposition. This may be the case, for example, when by a language change in a group and thereby the sentence does designate another proposition. From the proposition Porto is a city in Portugal are concluded other propositions like, for example, Porto is the economic centre of Portugal—assumed the sentence

10. “Porto is the economic centre of Portugal”

is an analytic sentence—or “There is only one economic centre of Portugal”. But it is not concluded that the sentence

11. “Porto is a city in Portugal”

designates the proposition *Porto is a city in Portugal*.

Therefore the truth value of a semantic proposition

12. “Porto is a city in Portugal”

is dependent on which proposition is designated by the sentence while the truth value of the statement about Porto is not dependent from semantic facts. From the sentence

13. “true (p , L)” is to conclude “ $(\exists x)\text{true}(x, L)$ ”:

there are sentences in particular the sentence p , but from p is not to conclude any sentence.

We can consider a situation within the equivalence

14. “‘Porto is a city in Portugal’ is true in L iff Porto is a city in Portugal”

is a false sentence. The sentence is false if there is no spoken language. Therefore it is to conclude the equivalences of the form *Truth* in Tarski style is not a condition of adequacy of the definition of truth.⁷⁸

4. *Truth and facts*. For the definition of truth we need the word “fact” thereby we state that a proposition is true. A true statement corresponds to a fact. Facts are not objects in the world (Russell-facts), but they satisfied truth or other fulfilment conditions. A satisfied fulfilment condition of a proposition is a fact and thereby truth corresponds to a fact which specified the true proposition. The fact that Porto is a city in Portugal is a satisfied true condition of a non-lingual proposition. It is not a property of sentences which makes propositions true or false: a statement is true *iff* it corresponds to the fact. This goes along with the conceptual distinction between “saying something” und “what is said”.

The notion of “proposition” as abstract entities was criticized from different views, for example, the “access argument” or the “never-say argument” (propositions or attributes also exist if they was never said). In general from a nominalistic point of view it is argued that there are no

⁷⁸ Pap, *Analytische Erkenntnistheorie*, pp. 64-65, 68.

propositions as abstract entities. This all is well-known. But it is lesser disputed that the nominalistic argument “propositions are to analyse in sentence - or utterance of sentence token” does not work.

(d) *The power of minimalism*

1. *Assumptions.* We come back to the question now:
what is the power of minimal semantics?

The view of formal semantic theories is fixing the content of sentence only and not the intended illocutionary forces. About that content there are no semantic intuitions. But also for the intended illocutionary forces there are no intuitions. Minimalism in semantics defends three assumptions:

1. there are a handful obvious context-sensitive expressions which take effect to the semantic content slightly only bringing into play Kaplan’s view⁷⁹,
2. the semantic context sensitivity is triggered syntactically and morphologically, and
3. fixing the semantic values of context-sensitive expression, that is, the speech situation, does not change the proposition which is expressed by the sentence semantically, for example, Peter is a reindeer is true if it is the case that Peter is and the sentence expresses the proposition *Peter is a reindeer*.

The semantic minimalism is neutral toward we assume the semantic content as propositions or as truth conditions.

From my point of view minimalism claims to show that if we assume that a moderate contextualism works then it follows by the application of

⁷⁹ D. Kaplan, *Demonstratives*, p. 489.

the CSA a radical contextualism. This is assumed as valid under the condition that there is a context-sensitive expression *a* which is not included in the basic set of context-sensitive expressions. A moderate version is therefore no stable turn in semantics (instability argument). The argument is: there is only one way to draw the borderline between the fixation of semantic values, the semantic context-sensitive expressions and the situational interpretation if we accept a particular basic set of expressions only which play a context-sensitive role.⁸⁰

The answer of the main question:

* „How much pragmatics is required for the interpretation of a particular semantic content of a sentence?“

is from the Cappelen's and Lepore's minimalism view „not a lot“, but the answer of the question

* „how many pragmatics is presupposed for the interpretation on *what is said* by a utterance?“

is “a lot“. The reason is that there are indeterminate set of propositions which take effect in speech acts. Therefore semantic minimalism connects a minimal semantics with a speech act pluralism. An interpreter has to make the assumption that there are an indeterminate set of propositions saying by

⁸⁰ From the minimalism point of view the basic set passes the different test of context sensitivity, that is, the “Inter-Contextual Disquotational Indirect Report Test”, the “Collective Descriptions Test”, and the “Inter-Contextual Disquotational Test”. The classification of context sensitive expression is dependent from whether the expressions pass the test or not. If we make the assumption that speaker and interpreter are in different situations then is the minimal proposition the guarantee that the reported content is the semantic content and at the same time that the same content is, for example, expressed, asserted, and advised.

speakers. Some of these propositions do not stand in any relation to the syntactic structured sentence and its semantic content. It is obvious that minimalism cannot accept this version of minimalism and from the minimalist point of view it is not to accept that there are indefinitely many propositions. We need another framing about this problem making minimalism strong enough against their opponents.

But it is not disputed that it is often the case that the speaker does not realize this situation. In many cases we realize this if something is going wrong with our communication-tries. For the interpreter's point of view is this information to add to the premises of the hypotheses of interpretation by alteration these assumption making linguistic behaviour intelligible.⁸¹ It is obvious that minimalism cannot accept this version of minimalism.

2. *Borg's question*. But from Cappelen's and Lepore's initiation of the *schism* is emerged the question "Is minimalism minimal enough?" responding the opponents of minimalism. If making the distinction between minimalists and contextualists then we do not turn to the question about the range of context-sensitive items or about mechanism operating in semantics.⁸² It is not disputed that they are indexical expression, but they have a semantic unified feature as a *class* of expressions. Therefore for minimalism is not the constraint to limit indexicality as its basic feature, because indexicals are semantic classes of expressions. Making this turn we come to a surprising result. Having in mind that the question is emerged from the initial situation of the *schism*. Just this is the new look of the problem about the semantics of indexicals.

⁸¹ Cappelen, Lepore, Shared Content, pp. 1020-1055. In Lepore, B. C. Smith, The Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006.

⁸² Borg, Minimalism versus Contextualism in Semantics, p. 358.

The question of indexicalism is in principle: if these expressions refer to single situation only then it is not impossible to fix a set of situations, that is, a set x of indices or points of references which refer to within a space-temporal framework uniquely. Call that:

* *bridge principle* between the limited set of indexicals and the open set of indexicals which are disputed from Cappelen, Lepore.

Every point of reference x is a set y_x of the entities which exist on x . If the extension of the constants is fixed for every point of reference x then is also fixed the meaning (intension). The relation to the interpretation of the reference relation of demonstrativa and to the points of reference x is to define by the concept of truth.⁸³

The Montague-procedure is:

- (a) The reference of indicator words is dependent from situations. First step: specification of a set of situations, that is, the set I of indices or points of reference therefore fixing complexes of relevant features of possible situations. Tempora requires time points only.
- (b) For every point of reference i is to specify a set I_i of existent entities.
- (c) The interpretation of the predicate and individual constants requires a function F , which pair to every constant and every point of reference i their extension. The extension of an individual constant is a component of UI_i (U universe of discourse) and the extension of a n-digits predicate constant is a

⁸³ R. M. Montague, *Pragmatics*, pp. 95-118, *Pragmatics and Intensional Logic*, pp. 119-147. In *Formal Philosophy. Selected Papers of Richard Montague*, Yale: Yale University 1976² has named the formal analysis of indexical words or sentences "pragmatics". But his formal description works in the semantics domain as well. An intensional logic does not commit us to any pragmatics.

subset of $(UI_i)^n$. If the extension of a constant for every point of reference is fixed then is also fixed its meaning (intension).

(d) The next step is the interpretation of the operators. Every operator is to pair to a relation R , that is, the set of pairs whose anterior parts are points of reference and the second part are sets of points of reference.

With this means we can give a model theoretical definition of the concept of interpretation of indexicals. This would be a further study.⁸⁴

It is to mention that the application of the *bridge principle* requires an *accessibility principle*. If we assume that indexicals are semantic classes then the semantic feature is their cross reference, for example, “here” has as cross reference “there”. This is guaranteed in the case of spatial indexicals by the spatial coordinate system. Yet thereby we have not a direct access to the spatial point of reference itself. This is possible in situation of direct awareness only. The only entities which are given us directly are entities of awareness. These entities themselves are framed in a spatial-temporal system.

3. *The word “I”*. Kaplan’s distinction between character and content of sentences is well-known. If I say “I have toothache” and another person says „I have toothache“ then the two person utter sentences with a different content. But the token of the sentence type has the same character. The character determines the content with respect to different contexts therefore the character of the sentence is a function of possible context to

⁸⁴ In a further step are to determinate the fulfillment condition for the operators N for R . It is furthermore to fix the connection between the semantic of indexicals and intensional languages. With the intensional language is to define the proposition operator. An application of an intensional language is, for example, the epistemic logic, Montague, *Pragmatics and Intensional Logic*, pp. 119-147. In *Formal Philosophy. On an intensional semantics*, F. von Kutschera, *Einführung in die intensionale Semantik*, Berlin: W. de Gruyter 1976.

propositional contents. Kaplan makes the distinction between *demonstratives*, like, this, that, which work by ostension and *pure indexicals*, like, I, here, today, yesterday, which require no ostension. The reference of pure indexicals is not determined sufficiently by linguistic rules. An “associated demonstration” to demonstratives is provided which is to understand in intentional expressions, because physical gestures do not guarantee fixing reference.⁸⁵

The speaker who utters the word *I* refer to himself directly and *I* can refer to *I* myself without to identify my self (essential indexical, direct ascription). I cannot point to I myself. In this case there is no demonstrative content. I am acquainted with I my-self immediately. Therefore I am not identified by the utterance of the word “I”. It is true that I cannot ascribe something to my-self from the third person stance as an indirect ascription. Therefore the word *I* has no Frege-sense. I do not call that “epistemic constraint” (G. Evans, he continues partially P. F. Strawson account), because it is not an epistemic relation of propositional knowledge of self-reference. Therefore the demonstrative utterance does not work only thereby that there is a position (object) of identification of the speaker (agent, thinker). It is more valid to call that “de se” constraint (D. Lewis, R. Chisholm, H.-N. Castañeda). But, for example, if the man on the phone says “I” to his addressee with the utterance of the word “I” only then the addressee cannot identify the speaker as a particular person. The speaker has to refer to, for example, “the man you met yesterday who has promised you to phone Wednesday at 1 o’clock p.m.” making itself identifiable for the

⁸⁵ Borg, *Minimal Semantics*, on J. Perry “reflexive” and referential” content with respect to “demonstrative content without epistemic constraints”, pp. 186-186, on “the nature of character”, pp. 196-203, on “objection: reflexive content is not semantic content at all”, pp. 203-208. S. Edwards, *Externalism in the Philosophy of Mind*, Aldershot: Avebury 1994, on demonstrative thought and Evans’ theory about demonstrative thought, pp. 157-192.

addressee.⁸⁶ This is an indirect ascription which presupposes direct ascriptions.

Borg argues that the hearer of an utterance “I am F” assumes that the utterance is true “if a is the producer of that token of ‘I’, then a is F, but the lexical entry for ‘I’ antecedently ensure that, whichever object a is, it must be a producer of that token ‘I’. Thus we have, just as we wanted, an aspect of meaning which figures in our semantic theory (at the level of the basic axioms) yet which makes no appearance in the final specification of the truth condition of the sentence uttered.”⁸⁷ This is near by the turn I have done. We have to add in the lexical entry that the producer is conscious about its mental states immediately. Therefore we ascribe consciousness from the third person attitude by quasi-indication (Castañeda).

4. *Formal route*. Making minimalism minimal enough is a matter of the formal route to meaning. Borg and Cappelen/Lepore agree about: semantic content is distinct from speech act content, but Cappelen/Lepore’s adopts that semantic content is a part of speech act content. Therefore a stronger minimalism gives up this commitment. But it is not disputed that there are many indeterminated situations of speech and communication. Ordinary speaker grabs or not in varied and different circumstances the literal meaning and communicative intentions, but a unified competence is required as precondition takes off with the procedure of interpretation.

5. *Divided interpretation*. The *priority of the literal meaning* and the *divided interpretation* mean, that is, there are many indeterminated speech

⁸⁶ Preyer, What is Self-Reference?. In Back to Cartesian Intuition. Internalism, Externalism and the Mental. Forthcoming, Subjektivität als präreflexives Bewusstsein. Jean-Paul Sartres bleibende Einsicht. Zu Manfred Franks Präreflexives Bewusstsein. Vier Vorlesungen. Academia.edu *under* Preyer *unit* Consciousness, Mind 2015.

⁸⁷ Borg, Minimal Semantics, pp. 166-167.

situations for the intelligible redescription, but there is one particular relation between the *sentence* and the semantic expressed *proposition*. This relation is to analyse by the semantic theory.

The divided interpretation between the semantic content and the indeterminated situation is an observation that there is no systematic theory about the *intended* content of speech act. This is reasoned thereby that there is no fixed connection between

1. the semantic content of a sentence,
2. the minimal expressed proposition and
3. the intended proposition of a speech act.

The intended proposition is not the same what Cappelen/Lepore has called “speech act content: indefinitely many proposition”. It is an intended proposition which is just no speech act content, but an intended event, state or action (communication). Cappeln/Lepore describes the situation between the “proposition semantical expressed (minimal context sensitivity)” and the “indefinitely many contexts of interpretation for utterance of interpretation of utterance”/“indefinitely many context of interpretation for utterance” as such we have “no theory, not systematic?). The divided interpretation is not to eliminate in principle. But we have the “bridge principle” handle this situation. It is an empirical matter how successful is its application.

Minimalism is a rejection of an *original utterance centrism* in semantics, that is, all accounts which make the assumption that the content of speech acts is determinated by the reference to assumptions of the speaker, the audience and the definition of the speech situation. The basic set of context sensitive expression has no theoretic significance. The

surprising result is that indexical reference is not a pragmatically triggered implicature which is implicit in an utterance materially. All these are secondary re-specifications (re-interpretations) which has a hard core of semantic content as presupposition.

(e) *Minimal moderate semantics*

1. *Grice-implicatures*. Borg has reviewed the to version of intention-based semantics from Grice (A-style) and Sperber/Wilson (B-style) and has analysed the differences between both.⁸⁸ A-style's key notion is the utterer's meaning, that is, *by uttering some linguistic item x, a speaker, U, meant that p* which is explained by speaker intentions: the speaker intends taking a effect a particular response on the audience side by the recognition of its intention.⁸⁹ The intentions are self-referential, because they are fulfilled if they are recognized themselves. Intentions has a preconditional function in the linguistic intercourse from the addressee's recognizing literal meaning. Borg emphasizes that Grice's strategy is a semantic one. He himself has not used the terminology semantics and pragmatics distinguishing between "what is said" and "what is implicated". For the B-style has not the recognition of the speaker intention a priority, but the relevance which makes the intention intelligible.⁹⁰ For both strategies semantic contents is dependent from speaker's intention.

⁸⁸ Borg, *Intention-Based Semantics*, pp. 250-266. In Lepore, B. C. Smith eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language*.

⁸⁹ On a 'old' critique on Grice, P. Ziff, *On H. P. Grice's Account of Meaning*, *Analysis* 28. 1 1967, pp. 377-388, on Grice-implicature Cappelen, Cappelen, *Semantics and Pragmatics: Some Central Issues*, pp. 9-20. In Preyer, Peter eds. *Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism*.

⁹⁰ Sperber, Wilson, *Relevance: Communication and Cognition*, (The) "main thesis ... is that an act of ostension carries a guarantee of relevance, and that this ... principle of relevance makes manifest the intention behind the ostension," p. 5.

2. *Intention-based semantics.* The two versions of intention-based semantics are different with respect to:

1. “*Are sentences or utterances the primary bearers of semantic content?*”.

Grice view is that speaker meaning is a crucial one. Semantic content is attached on sentences and not on utterances. On sentence level a conventional speaker meaning is emerged. Sperber/Wilson turn is that utterances is the instance of semantic content only. Speech acts (acts of ostensions) are connected immediately with propositional intentional states.⁹¹

2. “*What kind of cognitive processes are involved in recovering semantic content?*”.

Grice view is: meaning is recovered by syntactic trails. The addressee grasp the semantic content of a sentence recognizing the syntactic parts and their conventional use without mind-reading, because what is said by a given utterance has a priority. Sperber/Wilson turns to understand semantic content is a “reason-based” and an “inferential act” which is based on evidence from the addressee side, its interest, disposition, mutual knowledge and background attitudes which requires mind-reading of the speaker’s mind.⁹²

3. “*Is linguistic meaning a species of general ostensive behaviour?*”.

Grice does not assimilate language to communicative behaviour. Sperber/Wilson view is linguistic doings are ostensive behaviour in principle. Between “Pointing at a cake while licking one’s lips and asking

⁹¹ Borg, *Intention-Based Semantics*, pp. 257, 263.

⁹² Borg, *Intention-Based Semantics*, pp. 257-258, 261-263.

the baker for a slice” are no difference.⁹³ A theory of the agent mind is required from the observer’s side explaining the action.⁹⁴

The main distinction between both turns understanding utterance meaning is: for A-style claims all features of linguistic understanding are intentional mechanism and B-style claims understanding is decoding by inferential procedure. Both have not an answer to that linguistic meaning is special in principle. Borg turns placing intentions as in communication to the A-style. This turn has goes along with a revision of the function of intention in the theory of literal meaning. Therefore linguistic meaning is different from ostensive and gesture meaning.

3. *Minimal moderate semantics.* I agree with minimalism that the analysis of sentence meaning, that is,

1. the literal meaning of „saying that“ is to distinguish from
2. the illocutionary acts which are performed by sentence-utterances, that is, what is done by utterances, and
3. *both* is to distinguish from the speaker intentions, that is, what a speaker has intended to do.

Therefore it is to conclude: for redescriving *what is said* in different situation the speaker intentions are not a precondition to recover literal meaning.

Call that

⁹³ Borg, *Intention-Based Semantics*, p. 259.

⁹⁴ Borg, *Intention-Based Semantics*, pp. 259-260, 260-261.

* a *minimal moderate semantics* which is not focuses on the abstraction of sentence-types only, but on the utterance of sentence-types thereby we fix the truth/fulfilment conditional content. But the sentence-type cannot change its meaning by any use.

My view is that this turn is a coherent result from minimalism within the *schism*. Therefore the semantic content of literal meaning is prior to varied speech act intent semantically. It is this the reason that they are *no* speech act content as a part of semantic content, what ever. Sentences are the primary bearer of semantic content. This is the explanation of how is communication possible as the deepest question of semantics: the linguistic meaning crosses all contexts with respect to the competent speaker also in the case if the hearer/addressee has no access to the empirical intention of a speech act in a given situation. Therefore what a sentence literally means is not fixed on the speaker's intent and no intention can switch its meaning or can generate a speech act content.

The recognition of the propositional content goes along with

1. the specification of time-point of speech acts and
2. the reference of the singular terms as the verification condition of the propositional content.

But the specification of the propositional content by singular terms in particular by the indexicals is not a relativization of truth and not a pragmatic effect. If a statement is true it is true without any limit, for example, the sentence "It is/was raining in New York on September 1, at 9 o'clock p.m." is true eternally. The question for minimalism is that contrary to syntax-driven access to semantic content what the speaker means is

dependent from the speaker's point of view. Call that the *problem of indexicality*.⁹⁵

4. *Intentions and force*. When emerges a question on reference and on disambiguity then it is to recognize *what* the speaker has said. Just this is the power of minimalism and the reason, because the dual-pragmatic does not work. Therefore the traditional semantics-pragmatics distinction is to give up, because the

1. understanding of literal meaning is to distinguish from
2. the securing of the uptake of the intended illocutionary force of speech acts.⁹⁶

The intended illocutionary force is to systemize by speaker intentions, because the semantic theory of illocutionary acts isn't a theory of force completely. But also in this domain (theory of force) it is not the case for many illocutionary acts that the speaker has to secure its uptake by the intended force, for example, of orders as institutionalized illocutionary acts. For the theory of interpretation which we construct for speaker and groups, that is, for the linguistic communication, is the literal meaning relevant, for example, making an assertion, giving an advise and making a promise.⁹⁷ On

⁹⁵ Borg, *Pursuing Meaning*, chap. 4, Preyer, *Donald Davidson's Philosophy. From Radical Interpretation to Radical Contextualism*, Frankfurt a. M. 2011 (second edition), pp. 300-308. But I think we do not exclude epistemic restrictions of interpretation from the speech act pluralism view. The problem is not this restriction itself, but where we place them in our frame of reference.

⁹⁶ Borg, *Pursuing Meaning*, on semantically relevant intentions, pp. 112-115. On a critique on Austin's and Grice's conception of securing the uptake, P. F. Strawson, *Intention and Convention in Speech Acts*, 149-169, In *Logico-Linguistic Papers*, London: Methuen 1971, another critiques are, for example, of Searle, *Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1969 (first edition), pp. 42-50, and S. Schiffer, *Meaning*. Oxford: Clarendon 1972, pp. 143-154, he introduces the concept of mutual knowledge to deal with problems of Grice (1957).

⁹⁷ If the utterance of any sentence or word is an „order“ then is the act of order to correlate with the non-synonymous sentence, like for example, “Go!” and “I order you to go!”. If a speaker gives an advice then he does something, but we do not describe the future action of the addressee. The description is about the

this grounds we can utter illocutionary acts also with another intent, for example, the speaker means with the utterance of the sentence “Peter has a new dog” a warning, like for example, “Be careful, he has a bitchy dog”. The proposition *that the new dog of Peter is a bitchy dog* is not an intended proposition of the speaker, but it is not no speech act content. This intention does not add a further content to or change the literal meaning. The speaker intent of the recognition of a particular proposition from the addressee side is to distinguish from the literal meaning. The basic distinction is one between literal meaning and the intentions of the speaker. The realisation of the literal meaning by a speech act is not put into force by the semantic content itself, because the recognition of the intention, the acceptance or the refusal and the compliance is dependent from the addressee’s side as a condition of the success of the speech act. But these conditions are not conditions of the realization of a speech act in any language which is just not dependent from addressees or target groups. Therefore we make the distinction between the syntactic-semantic feature of illocutionary acts as a realization in a given language and the conditions of success of illocutionary act, that is, understanding of an addressee, acceptance or not and the implementation. Understanding itself is dependent from the concept of literal meaning basically. If this works then there is no mind reading, but word reading, and no theory of intuitive utterance content about speaker can dispose respectively like they want.

Therefore speaker intention is not the key for linguistic meaning. There is only one semantic content and different intentions which are to recognize in particular speech and acting situations. The recognition of the

state-of-affair if the questionable action is done. The speaker utters an open proposition which is to fulfil. The reasoning about whether the speaker is authorized giving advices is a particular condition of interaction which does not add something to the open proposition semantically. But we need no rule governing linguistic behaviour fixing the moods syntactically and semantically and the mood does not determinate the illocutionary (intended) force empirically.

communicative intention is not a magic event. We add to a given reading of a semantic content further information about the utterance meaning. But minimalism does not turn to any version of mindreading as constraints of interpretation.

5. *Against speaker reference.* Borg argues the semantic content of ‘That is red’ in a given speech situation *s* contains a singular concept in subject-position and the content is exhausted by the speaker reference. Linguistic understanding of any hearer is based that the hearer can think about the object under a token-reflexive description given the “character of the concept”: “the actual object referred to by the speaker with this token “that””. In such cases the hearer has not to identify the object substantially. It is to conclude that all token of ‘that is F’ have the same non-propositional meaning (a character-based content) and the speaker utterance (intent) can refer to indefinite numbers of different objects in different context.⁹⁸

If we make the assumption that the propositional attitudes which are expressed in sentences are to evaluate by fulfilment conditions then the performance of these attitudes are to be categorized by the semantics of these conditions.⁹⁹

(f) *Consequence*

1. *Some results.* The *schism* in the philosophy and theory of language is initiated by categorization of the truth/fulfilment-evaluation of the semantic content. In the meantime there is no rout behind the *schism*,

⁹⁸ Borg, *Pursuing Meaning*, pp. 135-140.

⁹⁹ But the mental is not to characterize by propositional attitudes only. All mental states are unified by subjective experience.

because the answer of the question on the role of truth-condition in semantics is no to harmonize between the parties. The basic conflict is the answer of the question: how is the concept “what is said” to analyse, that is, what are the semantic properties, for example, propositions, truth- or other fulfilment conditions, and what is the role of intuitive judgements understanding speech acts? The *schism* is not to eliminate, because the assumption about the scopes of the semantic theory is different in principle.

The surprising turn within the *schism* is:

1. indexicals are a class of semantic expressions,
2. there is no speech act content, but a semantic content only,
3. no intention, what ever, can modify the semantic content, and
4. but every semantic content can uttered with different intentions; the intended proposition is an intent of the speaker (agent) which is to recognize by the definition of the situation.

Austin has argued that illocutionary acts are not statements. In opposition the critique is that every illocutionary act is also a statement. Both are right: if are make, for example, a promise then I do something, but I do it by saying something. But no utterance of any semantic content (proposition) decides about what the addressee does as consequence of the speech situation absolutely. There are bifurcations possible about what is happened in the history of communication which are more or less probable in the social intercourse with respect to the so-called “definition and logic of situation”.

The divided interpretation works generally. *Minimal moderate semantics* is “minimal” enough making the turn against the opponents of minimal semantics in general: no-literal meaning of utterances in multiple

speech act situation does not give the utterance of the sentence a further content. There is no such content. But in this case is to recognize the speaker intention from the audience. Different intentions do not give the semantic content further contents. These recognition would be not possible if there is no literal semantic intent of the uttered sentences. Pure performatives, like, for example, “Ouch!” are not a falsification of the propositional view. No actions and uses can give our words their meaning. Would this the case then there were no generativity of language which figures out the understanding of sentence we have never heard, and as consequence there is no explanation, because communication is successful ultimately. The notion of „use of language“ is a confused one. I use the coffee machine making coffee. But I do not use the language or sentences making, for example, a statement or give a advice. A sentence is uttered. I may have different intentions and I can pursue all my progressing purpose uttering or writing something. The main problem is that we have to distinguish the semantics from the action theory.

2. *They never come back!* Borg argues along these lines and claims to show that minimalism is “the best game in town”.¹⁰⁰ It is obvious that we have not any understanding of speech acts if we do not know the literal meaning firstly. As consequence is to conclude from Borg’s systematization of the happened *schism* that it runs deeper as it seems *prima vista*, because the confused distinction between semantic and non-semantic speech act content is to give up now in principle. In particular it is high time coming to the end of the Wittgenstein interpretation industry. From Borg’s turn within the *schism* is to conclude: Wittgensteinian and pragmatics never come back, because there is no distinction between semantic and pragmatic

¹⁰⁰ Borg, *Pursuing Meaning*, p. xxii.

content of speech acts: “The God of the Old Testament is an austere God”.^{101 102}

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¹⁰¹ Fodor and Lepore, *Why Meaning (Probably) isn't Conceptual*, p. 26, In *The Compositionality Papers*.

¹⁰² Many commentators provided valuable pointers. I am particularly grateful to Henryk Jaronowski, for his attention to the text.

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